

## Message Text

SECRET

PAGE 01 BANGKO 23631 101248Z

46

ACTION SS-25

INFO OCT-01 ISO-00 SSO-00 NSCE-00 /026 W

----- 074094

O 101209Z NOV 75

FM AMEMBASSY BANGKOK

TO SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 4018

S E C R E T BANGKOK 23631

EXDIS

DEPARTMENT PASS SECDEF, JCS, CINCPAC, CINCPACAF, CSAF

E.O. 11652 GDS

TAGS: PFOR, MARR, TH

SUBJ: U.S. FORCE REDUCTIONS IN THAILAND - NEGOTIATING  
INSTRUCTIONS

REF: (A) STATE 265537; (B) STATE 265541

1. EMBASSY IS MOST APPRECIATIVE OF WASHINGTON'S  
PROMPT RESPONSE TO OUR REQUEST FOR DRAWDOWN DETAILS,  
AND FOR CLARIFICATION OF CERTAIN ASPECTS OF THE  
RESIDUAL U.S. PRESENCE.

2. AS SOME ELEMENTS NEW TO US HAVE EMERGED, WE OFFER  
THE FOLLOWING:

(A) REF B, PARA 3G, REQUIREMENT TO RETAIN A U.S.  
CAPABILITY FOR A STORAGE FACILITY AT UTAPAO FOR WAR  
RESERVE AIR MUNITIONS. THE RTG WOULD UNQUESTIONABLY  
WANT TO KNOW THE REASONS FOR THIS REQUIREMENT, THUS  
OPENING THE ENTIRE QUESTION OF REENTRY RIGHTS FOR U.S.  
COMBAT FORCES, WHICH THE RTG IS NOT PREPARED TO CONSIDER AT  
THIS TIME. MOREOVER, OUR UNDERSTANDING FROM U.S. MILITARY  
SOURCES IS THAT THE CONTINGENCY FOR THE WAR RESERVE AIR  
MUNITIONS IS AN OVERT CHINESE ATTACK ON THAILAND. THIS DOES  
NOT APPEAR TO BE A REALISTIC CONTINGENCY. WE URGE THAT THIS  
NON-SALEABLE REQUIREMENT WHICH CANNOT BE MANAGED INCONSPIC-

SECRET

SECRET

PAGE 02 BANGKO 23631 101248Z

UOUSLY AND FOR WHICH PACAF ESTIMATES A PERSONNEL LEVEL OF

ALMOST 200 AIRMEN BE DROPPED.

(B) REF A, PARAS 7 AND 11, MANPOWER. THE FIGURES WITH WHICH WE ARE DEALING (RESIDUAL FORCE OF NO MORE THAN 3,000; RETROGRADE FORCE CEILING OF 1,000) ARE LARGER THAN THE RTG EXPECTS. WERE WE TO SURFACE THEM, EVEN AS CEILINGS, WE WOULD FIND OURSELVES CONFRONTED WITH THAI COUNTERPROPOSALS WHICH WOULD IN ALL LIKELIHOOD BE MUCH LOWER, BUT WHICH WOULD QUICKLY BECOME FIXED THAI POSITIONS. THE BEST WAY TO APPROACH THIS MATTER IS BY AVOIDING TOTAL RESIDUAL MANNING FIGURES AT THIS STAGE, IF POSSIBLE. INSTEAD, WE SHOULD DEAL WITH THE FUNCTIONS TO BE PERFORMED, WITH APPROPRIATE MANNING TO BE WORKED OUT LATER AT THE WORKING LEVEL. IN THIS WAY, THE FINAL FIGURES WILL EMERGE NATURALLY OVER A PERIOD OF SEVERAL MONTHS, AND THE THAI WILL BE MORE LIKELY TO ACCEPT WHAT WE NEED BY WAY OF MANPOWER ONCE THEY HAVE AGREED TO THE FUNCTIONS TO BE PERFORMED. IN OUR DISCUSSIONS WITH THE THAI, WE WILL NOT MINIMIZE THE ORDERS OF MAGNITUDE WE ARE TALKING ABOUT, AND AS INSTRUCTED WILL DISABUSE CHATCHAI OF HIS APPARENT NOTION THAT OUR ULTIMATE PRESENCE HERE WILL NUMBER ABOUT 500.

(C) REF B, PARA 3A, C-130'S. IN TALKING WITH OUR MILITARY COLLEAGUES HERE AND VISITORS FROM 13TH AF AND HQ PACAF, WE HAVE NOT RPT NOT BEEN ABLE TO ESTABLISH A BASIS FOR THE REQUIREMENT TO SUPPORT UP-COUNTRY SITES WITH C-130'S. WE WILL INCLUDE AIR SUPPORT FOR THE RESIDUAL PRESENCE IN OUR NEGOTIATIONS WITH THE THAI AS INSTRUCTED, BUT WE BELIEVE C-130'S STATIONED AT UTAPAO SHOULD BE DROPPED FROM THE RESIDUAL PRESENCE, UNLESS A BETTER JUSTIFICATION CAN BE ESTABLISHED THAN WE ARE ABLE TO SEE SO FAR. THE PRESENCE HERE OF C-130'S AFTER MARCH 19, 1976 CAN, OF COURSE, BE JUSTIFIED FOR A WHILE ON THE GROUNDS THAT THEY ARE NEEDED FOR RETROGRADE OF MATERIEL.

3. REF B NOTES THAT WE ENVISION THE USE OF "A PORTION OF UTAPAO" FOR OUR RESIDUAL NEEDS, BUT REF A GIVES NO PARTICULARS ON A DRAWDOWN OF U.S. FORCES AND AIRCRAFT PRESENTLY AT UTAPAO OR ON TURNOVER OF THE PORTION WE WILL CEASE TO USE. AS WE HAVE POINTED OUT BEFORE, COME MARCH 19, 1976, IT WILL HAVE TO APPEAR THAT THERE ARE NO U.S. BASES IN THAILAND. IN A FORMAL SENSE,

SECRET

SECRET

PAGE 03 BANGKO 23631 101248Z

THIS MEANS THAT WE WILL HAVE TO GO THROUGH THE MOTIONS OF LOWERING THE FLAG AND OSTENSIBLY TURNING UTAPAO OVER THE THE RTG JUST AS WE WILL HAVE DONE WITH UDORN AND KORAT. THIS DOES NOT IN ITSELF IMPLY ANYTHING IN PARTICULAR (EXCEPT A LOW PROFILE) AS FAR AS OUR SUBSEQUENT OPERATIONS AT UTAPAO ARE CONCERNED, BUT IT DOES MEAN THAT WE WILL HAVE TO GO THROUGH A PRO-FORMA TURN-OVER. WE WOULD THINK MARCH 15 WOULD DO AS WELL AS ANY OTHER DATE FOR THIS PURPOSE. WE WILL ALSO NEED UTAPAO

AIRCRAFT (E.G., KC-135) WITHDRAWAL GUIDANCE.

4. DEPARTMENT AND OTHER CONCERNED WASHINGTON AGENCIES CAN TAKE IT AS GIVEN THAT WE WILL CARRY OUT OUR INSTRUCTIONS FULLY AND TO THE BEST OF OUR ABILITY. WE WILL ALSO CONTINUE TO ADVISE THE DEPARTMENT WHEN A PARTICULAR ELEMENT OF THOSE INSTRUCTIONS SEEMS TO US UNWORKABLE OR THREATENS TO UNDERCUT THE ACHIEVEMENT OF THE OVERALL GOAL IN THE CURRENT NEGOTIATING CLIMATE IN THAILAND. IT IS IN THIS CONTEXT THAT WE URGE THAT A FLEXIBLE APPROACH BE MAINTAINED, PARTICULARLY ON THE QUESTION OF UTAPAO WHERE THE RESIDUAL ACTIVITIES WE WISH TO KEEP WILL HAVE TO BE TAILORED TO THAI POLITICAL IMPERATIVES.  
WHITEHOUSE

NOTE BY OC/T: NOT PASSED ABOVE ADDRESSEE

SECRET

NNN

## Message Attributes

**Automatic DecapTIONing:** Z  
**Capture Date:** 01 JAN 1994  
**Channel Indicators:** n/a  
**Current Classification:** UNCLASSIFIED  
**Concepts:** MILITARY ASSISTANCE, TROOP DEPLOYMENT, INSTRUCTIONS, NEGOTIATIONS  
**Control Number:** n/a  
**Copy:** SINGLE  
**Draft Date:** 10 NOV 1975  
**DecapTION Date:** 28 MAY 2004  
**DecapTION Note:** 25 YEAR REVIEW  
**Disposition Action:** RELEASED  
**Disposition Approved on Date:**  
**Disposition Authority:** GolinoFR  
**Disposition Case Number:** n/a  
**Disposition Comment:** 25 YEAR REVIEW  
**Disposition Date:** 28 MAY 2004  
**Disposition Event:**  
**Disposition History:** n/a  
**Disposition Reason:**  
**Disposition Remarks:**  
**Document Number:** 1975BANGKO23631  
**Document Source:** CORE  
**Document Unique ID:** 00  
**Drafter:** n/a  
**Enclosure:** n/a  
**Executive Order:** GS  
**Errors:** N/A  
**Film Number:** D750390-0228  
**From:** BANGKOK  
**Handling Restrictions:** n/a  
**Image Path:**  
**ISecure:** 1  
**Legacy Key:** link1975/newtext/t19751160/aaaacbqk.tel  
**Line Count:** 131  
**Locator:** TEXT ON-LINE, ON MICROFILM  
**Office:** ACTION SS  
**Original Classification:** SECRET  
**Original Handling Restrictions:** EXDIS  
**Original Previous Classification:** n/a  
**Original Previous Handling Restrictions:** n/a  
**Page Count:** 3  
**Previous Channel Indicators:** n/a  
**Previous Classification:** SECRET  
**Previous Handling Restrictions:** EXDIS  
**Reference:** 75 STATE 265537, 75 STATE 265541  
**Review Action:** RELEASED, APPROVED  
**Review Authority:** GolinoFR  
**Review Comment:** n/a  
**Review Content Flags:**  
**Review Date:** 23 JUL 2003  
**Review Event:**  
**Review Exemptions:** n/a  
**Review History:** RELEASED <23 JUL 2003 by ShawDG>; APPROVED <24 JUL 2003 by GolinoFR>  
**Review Markings:**

Margaret P. Grafeld  
Declassified/Released  
US Department of State  
EO Systematic Review  
06 JUL 2006

**Review Media Identifier:**  
**Review Referrals:** n/a  
**Review Release Date:** n/a  
**Review Release Event:** n/a  
**Review Transfer Date:**  
**Review Withdrawn Fields:** n/a  
**Secure:** OPEN  
**Status:** NATIVE  
**Subject:** U.S. FORCE REDUCTIONS IN THAILAND - NEGOTIATING INSTRUCTIONS  
**TAGS:** PFOR, MARR, TH  
**To:** STATE  
**Type:** TE  
**Markings:** Margaret P. Grafeld Declassified/Released US Department of State EO Systematic Review 06 JUL 2006